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Tamar Frankel†
INTRODUCTION
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Adolf A. Berle
and Gardiner Means wrote about the separation of ownership from control in corporations. They noted that the interests of the controlling directors and managers can diverge from those of the shareholder owners
of the firm.1
They wrote:
It has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right
both to use his own property as he sees fit and to receive the full
fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, for profits, can be relied upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any industrial property he may possess.
In the quasi-public corporation, such an assumption no longer holds.
As we have seen, it is no longer the individual himself who uses his
wealth. Those in control of that wealth, and therefore in a position
to secure industrial efficiency and produce profits, are no longer, as
owners, entitled to the bulk of such profits. Those who control the
destinies of the typical modern corporation own so insignificant a
fraction of the company’s stock that the returns from running the
corporation profitably accrue to them in only a very minor degree.
The stockholders, on the other hand, to whom the profits of the corporation go, cannot be motivated by those profits to a more efficient
use of the property, since they have surrendered all disposition of it
to those in control of the enterprise. The explosion of the atom of
property destroys the basis of the old assumption that the quest for
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profits will spur the owner of industrial property to its effective
use.2

Berle and Means concluded that the separation of ownership from
control would lead to the inefficient use of property because the motivation for the most efficient use of the property would no longer lie with
those who profit from the enterprise.3 Harold Laski expressed a similar
concern, focusing on those who control the corporations. He suggested
that the modern corporation may have to face control by dishonest managers in addition to inefficiency.
Under the modern company laws, any body of men may secure capital from its owners, with no sufficient guarantee either of a genuine
service to be rendered or of a possible return on the investment.
The company may be dishonest in its operation, or inefficient, without the public being able at any point to have knowledge. Its proceedings are wrapped in secrecy . . . .4

Today’s scholars have similarly identified this separation of components of ownership, naming the separation “decoupling.” These scholars note the decoupling of the “bundle of rights” represented by a traditional financial asset, such as a share of stock. Professors Hu and Black
noted, for example, that “[l]ongstanding legal and economic theories of
the public corporation assume that the elements of this package of rights
and obligations are generally bundled together—and in particular that
voting rights are linked to an economic interest in the corporation, and
usually held in proportion to that economic interest.”5 They then note
that decoupling changes this package of rights.
There are those who consider such a decoupling beneficial. Others
express the same concern that Berle and Means have expressed. And
depending on what one focuses on in viewing the pluses and minuses of
these separations, one could reach different conclusions. I reach a number of conclusions. First, the separation of ownership from control
creates the problems that Berle, Means, and Laski noted, regardless of
how sophisticated, complex, or enticing the separation is. That is, those
2. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 9 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932).
3. Id.
4. HAROLD J. LASKI, A GRAMMAR OF POLITICS 477–78 (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press 1929)
(1925).
5. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Debt, Equity, and Hybrid Decoupling: Governance and
Systemic Risk Implications, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 663, 664 (2008). Hu and Black explain that
“[s]ome of these rights are economic, including dividend, liquidation, and appraisal rights under
corporate law. Some rights are not purely monetary, including voting rights, director fiduciary duties, rights to bring suits and inspect corporate records, access to corporate proxy machinery, and so
on.” Id. at 666.
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who control but do not own may control corporations inefficiently and
sometimes dishonestly. Second, there is a need to maximize the benefits
from decoupling while minimizing the potential losses by those who do
not have their “skin” in the losses. Above all, the aspects of decoupling
that pose a threat to the financial system must be controlled by private
and public regulation.6 The time has come to raise the scholarly and
public awareness about these issues.
This Article is organized in three parts. Part One examines the nature of financial assets and their transition by market transactions from
contracts to property. The discussion highlights the gray areas which
financial assets occupy in decoupling, falling within both contract and
property law.
Part Two describes four types of decoupled financial assets. The
first type separates into two financial assets: ownership benefits and
ownership risks. The presumed reduction of owners’ risks prompted
some academics to justify reducing the owners’ protection. I suggest that
attempts to protect owners from ownership risk have failed. Therefore,
the suggestion was ill-conceived. The second type of decoupling separates into two financial assets: voting control and the ownership of financial assets. It creates “empty votes.” This innovation can be abused in
many different ways, as has been shown. The third type of decoupling
is, in fact, coupling. It is called “reverse exchange securities.” The
fourth form of decoupling is process-based securitization. In fact, it may
have been the first to appear publicly in the 1970s. It offers advantages,
but excesses have created great disadvantages. Part Two concludes by
noting that during the past thirty years, fundamental financial concepts
and designs have been warped or eliminated. Therefore, we must reanalyze the new financial assets to discover whether the decoupling of these
assets produces the results Berle and Means were concerned with.
Part Three poses a number of questions. First, does decoupling undermine the traditional property-type protections? Second, does decoupling warrant more regulation? Third, where is decoupling headed?7
Fourth, what regulation can we expect for current decouplings? And
finally in this part, I argue that a radical regulatory view may be worth
examining based on the principle that those who create benefits and risks
for sale may not collect just part of the benefits. They should have “skin
6. It seems that those who control without ownership are lobbying hard to avoid regulation in
order to protect their profits. Randall Smith & Sarah N. Lynch, How Overhauling Derivatives Died,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2009, at B1 (regulators press for exchanges but introducing exchanges would
reduce profits).
7. Robert Ahdieh and Professor Jill E. Fisch asked these questions at the conference held at
Seattle University Law School on November 7, 2009.
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in the game” and bear a significant part of the risk as well; then, many of
the problems that we reviewed might be ameliorated.
I. THE NATURE OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND THE APPLICATION OF
CONTRACT AND PROPERTY LAWS
A. What Are Financial Assets?
I define financial assets to mean promises by one person or institution to another person or institution to pay money or deliver another financial asset upon certain conditions, in exchange for money or another
financial asset to be provided immediately or at a later date. Financial
assets differ from real assets and from money because they consist of
promises; in other words, they are contractual promises.8
Like real assets, some financial assets are tradable—for example,
shares of stock—and some are not tradable—for example, loans. This
distinction is crucial because non-tradable financial assets are treated in
law as contracts. Tradable financial assets are treated in law as contracts
as well, but the trading of these contracts is treated as the trading of
property and is subject to conditions different from contract law.
Contract law is designed to encourage interaction among fewer and
more specific parties.9 Therefore, the parties may agree on any legal
terms, impose limitations on the transfer of the contract rights to others
and, with some exceptions, keep the terms of their relationships secret;
contract law allows the parties to “personalize” their relationship. In
contrast, property law is designed to encourage the creation and development of markets.10 Therefore, to reduce information costs, property
law limits the deviations of terms classifying ownership property to approximately thirteen types.11 In addition, property law declines to enforce a total prohibition on the transfer of property; such a prohibition is

8. Since the dollar got off the gold standard, a dollar can be viewed as a promise backed by the
full faith and credit of the United States.
9. Cf. Tamar Frankel, The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and Property
Law, 73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 398 n.38 (1993).
10. Cf. id.
11. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.1 (3d ed.
2000) (classifying present estates as “freehold” or “nonfreehold” and “inheritable” or “noninheritable”); id. § 3.1 (discussing future interests); Lawrence C. Becker, The Moral Basis of Property
Rights, in NOMOS XXII 190–92 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
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deemed contrary to public policy.12 Further, property law imposes different degrees of publicity regarding transfers of property.13
B. Financial Assets Offer Promises and Combine Contract and Property
Law
One feature of financial assets is that they combine contract and
property. To be sure, property rights include the right to contract with
others on various terms. Financial assets, however, consist of the parties’
agreements. The law rarely imposes conditions on the structure and
terms of these agreements; they are, after all, contracts. However,
agreements subject to market trading must be suitable for trading, and
market rules apply to tradable financial assets, including publicity of relevant information. If, however, the number of parties is small, and the
parties are wealthy and sophisticated, then more of the contract view will
be taken, and the availability of legal intervention will be weakened.
As noted, like property rights in real assets, trading in financial assets is limited to a fairly small number of forms of alienation (e.g., sale,
lease). However, the content of financial assets, being contracts, remains
unlimited.14 It is assumed that, regardless of their complexity, disclosure
of the terms of these assets will suffice to protect the buyers and the traders from misunderstanding the benefits and risks that they are taking.
One could argue that some real assets are highly complex as well. After
all, most buyers of electronic and other complex instruments do not understand what these instruments are made of. However, most complex
real assets are easier to evaluate: they work or do not work. Because financial assets consist of promises to do something in the future, it is far
more difficult to predict whether and how the promises will be kept.
And while there are often government and commercial standards for real
assets, there are fewer government standards for financial assets; they
have remained promises by contracts.
In addition, historically, financial assets represented real assets. Financial assets later moved to representing financial assets that may or
may not represent real assets. This process resulted in rendering promises very similar to, and as important as, real assets. The process of parties
betting on the outcome of a certain event concerning real assets or enter12. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 404–427 (1936); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra
note 11, § 2.3, at 36–37 (discussing Restatement); Frankel, supra note 9, at 402 (citing authorities).
13. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 4 (2008) (requiring recordation of conveyance of
estates in fee simple, fee tail, for life, and certain other interests in land); U.C.C. § 6-105 (2009)
(requiring notice of bulk sale to seller’s claimants); Frankel, supra note 9, at 401 (citing authorities).
14. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006) (defining “security” to include
any of a long list of interests).
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prises, shifted to bets on the performance of financial assets in the market
for financial assets. The legal prohibition on betting has all but disappeared.15
Today’s markets in financial assets have grown significantly.16 Accompanying or leading this growth was a rise in decoupling. It is harder
and costlier to decouple a real asset as compared to a financial asset.
Decoupling is a step towards changing the terms of promises. This step
leads to the next step of creating a market in the decoupled pieces. The
separation is complete but, as we have experienced in the case of securitization, it can breed the problem of sub-prime mortgages. Thus, trading
in financial assets is, in essence, trading in promises to do something in
the future, often based on promises of yet another party’s future promise—a world of promise-based promises.
II. FOUR TYPES OF DECOUPLINGS
A. Ownership Without Risk
A number of excellent and illuminating articles describe the
changes that have occurred in the structure of financial assets in recent
decades. Professors Charles Whitehead and Ronald Gilson examined the
decoupling of benefits and risks related to shares and the assimilation of
shares to debt.17 Traditionally, share ownership was viewed as more
risky than debt ownership. The authors suggest that this higher risk justified the right to the following: residual profits; the right to vote for the
directors of the corporation; the right to vote on some important decisions concerning the future of the corporation; the right to sue derivatively under certain circumstances; and the imposition of fiduciary duties on
the directors, including fiduciary duties towards bondholders when the
corporation became bankrupt and the bondholders became, in fact,
shareholders.18
15. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905);
Albers v. Lamson, 42 N.E.2d 627, 630 (Ill. 1942); Roy Kreitner, Essay, Speculations of Contract, or
How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1102–
13 (2000) (discussing development of distinction between futures trading and gambling).
16. See Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction—Structured Finance and Credit Market
Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 56–57 (2009) (“In 2005, global financial assets . . . were calculated at US $165-trillion, . . . nearly four times the global GDP.”).
17. Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership,
Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008).
18. I would add another rationale for strengthening shareholder-owners’ control: it is fundamental. America is a capitalistic country. Those who own have the right to the residual profits and
to control. The issue is not merely risk but entitlement to ownership. Those who serve, no matter
how able, creative, and innovative they are, do not, and should not, have ultimate control. Lenders
may bear high risk but are not entitled to residual profits or to control. In addition, if risk is the
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Professors Whitehead and Gilson noted that recently, the components of shareholder risk, benefit, and control have been separated. In
Deconstructing Equity, they explain that, traditionally, “a firm’s scale
and scope turned on the tradeoff between the gains from expansion and
the agency costs of debt and equity. . . .”19 However, the past three decades gave rise to an “explosive growth in new instruments to facilitate a
private owner’s purchase of risk bearing and liquidity in discrete slices,”
by which executives may use “risk management”20 to hedge specific
risks to which the corporations they manage are exposed. Companies
can transfer risk “by the slice, like New York pizza, rather than in the
aggregate through common stock.”21 Therefore, private enterprise can
fund working capital debt. The authors conclude that reduction of risk
for shareholders can align “management and shareholder incentives.”22
How does risk slicing work?
Weather derivatives, such as those underlying [Agricore United’s]
insurance contract, can be more finely sliced into risks associated
with temperatures in an identified region or group of cities, levels of
snowfall and frost, and even the occurrence of hurricanes. Through
‘catastrophe bonds,’ investors can now take on risks as diverse as
earthquakes in Southeast Asia, flooding in Great Britain, and
windstorms in Japan. At the cutting edge, economic derivatives
permit financial intermediaries to precisely hedge their exposures to
a growing array of macroeconomic risks, as evidenced by macroeconomic data releases—ranging from changes in U.S. employment
rates to U.S. retail sales, industrial production, consumer prices, and
economic growth—on which the value of those instruments is
based.23

These are impressive risk-reducing tools. Yet, the theory that corporations can reduce the shareholders’ risks and equate shares to debt has
proven weak for two reasons. First, management’s interests were not
aligned with the interests of the shareholders. Management had incentives to increase the enterprises’ short-term risks and gain, and it did. In
fact, management and shareholder interests grew apart as shareholders
measure of control we will end up with managers—those who provide service—as owners, a contrary conclusion to capitalism.
19. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 17, at 242 (summarizing Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 319–23 (1976)).
20. Id. at 243 (defining “risk management” as “a firm-level management discipline that identifies and measures risks that may affect firm value, assists in choosing which risks to retain and
which to transfer, and then implements and monitors strategies to execute those decisions”).
21. Id. at 251.
22. Id. at 251–52.
23. Id. at 246–47 (citations omitted).
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suffered greater longer-term losses while management reaped increased
short-term gains.24 Consequently, shareholders bore higher, not lower,
risks and losses. Second, shareholder risks were not reduced because the
risk coverage was not effective; the coverage relied on transfers of risk to
unregulated entities and on faulty risk predictions.
The risk coverage was not effective. Risk-transfer tools work if,
and only if, the promisors who offer to cover the risks are able to do so
when the losses occur. If the promisors have not appropriately calculated
the probability of the losses which they offer to cover, or do not have the
money to cover the losses of materialized risks that they correctly calculated, then the losses from the risks taken by corporate managers will be
higher. They will pay for risk coverage, which they do not receive, and
expose their enterprise to higher risk and losses. In sum, it is just as important to make sure that the risk will be actually covered as it is to splice
it. It seems that innovators are focusing more attention on splicing and
less on assuring coverage.
The new risk transfers rely not only on regulated institutions such
as insurance companies, but also on promises of various unregulated entities. It transpired that while the buyers of risk coverage increased their
risks in reliance on the coverage, many promisors who were supposed to
cover these financial risks could not make the risk-buyers whole.25
Additionally, the risk-predictability was faulty. The innovative new
risk-transfers are similar to, but not quite the same as, traditional insurance. Traditional insurance is based on the law of large numbers. Even
though an insurance company does not know when an insured will die,
the company knows the percentage of persons of the insured’s age and
circumstances who are very likely to die. The same system covers “longevity insurance”–annuities (the risk that the insured will outlive his or
her savings). In addition, insurance schemes are regulated to prevent insurance companies from collecting premiums, speculating or wasting
their assets, and failing to have sufficient resources to meet their future
obligations.
Many of the new risk-transfers cannot rely on the law of large
numbers. Financial models have failed to predict the financial risks.
That is in part because the factors embedded in these models are not in24. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (forthcoming) (on file with author) (“[T]he executives’ risks are those of workers and not of capitalists. The risk and the benefits of the owners are
more directly linked to the fortunes of the enterprise. Managers participate in the owners’ benefit but
have rejected participation in the owners’ risks.”).
25. See, e.g., Sen. Collins Introduces Legislation to Strengthen Financial Regulation and Oversight, STATES NEWS SERV., Nov. 18, 2008 (noting that the failure of an investment bank holding
company and the federal takeover of an insurance company were caused in part by risk exposures
from credit-default swaps).
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dependent of one another. Combining the same risk-experience by many
people allows an insurance company to cover the cost of those who experience the serious losses from the small payments made by those who did
not suffer the losses.
In practice, insurance is available only when the Law of Large
Numbers is observed. The law requires that the risk insured must
be both large in number and independent of one another, like successive deals in a game of poker.
‘Independent’ means several things: it means that the cause of a
fire, for example, must be independent of the actions of the policyholder. It also means that the risks insured must not be interrelated,
like the probable movement of any one stock at a time when the
whole stock market is taking a nose dive, or the destruction caused
by a war.26

The failure of the new risk-prediction was due to the absence of independent risk factors:
Wall Street and regulators relied on complex mathematical models
that told financial institutions how much risk they were taking at
any given time. Since the 1990s, risk management on Wall Street
has been dominated by a model called ‘value at risk’
(VaR). . . . The model predicts with 99 percent probability that institutions cannot lose more than a certain amount of money. Institutions compare this ‘worst case’ with their actual capital and, if the
amount of capital is greater, sleep soundly at night. Regulators,
knowing that the institutions used these models also slept soundly . . . .
Lurking behind the models, however, was a colossal conceptual error: the belief that risk is randomly distributed and that each event
has no bearing on the next event in a sequence. This is typically
explained with a coin-toss analogy. If you flip a coin and get
‘heads’ and then do it again, the first heads has no bearing on
whether the second toss will be heads or tails. It’s a common fallacy that if you get three heads in a row, there’s a better-than-even
chance that the next toss will be tails. That’s simply not true . . . .
But what if markets are not like coin tosses? What if risk is not
shaped like a bell curve? What if new events are profoundly affected by what went before?27

26. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 204 (1998).
27. James G. Rickards, A Mountain, Overlooked: How Risk Models Failed Wall St. and Washington, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2008, at A23, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/10/01/AR2008100101149.html.
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There was insufficient data and understanding to evaluate the purported risk-protection instruments and the incentives of management. In
sum, the shareholders of corporations whose management bought risk
coverage bore higher, not lower, risks. They were entitled to higher, not
lower, controls over their management.
B. “Empty Voting”—Control by Voting Without Ownership
Professors Henry Hu and Bernard Black noted the separation of
shareholder ownership from voting.28 Corporate law generally makes
voting power proportional to the number of shares a shareholder holds.
While there are exceptions, the power to vote was linked to the economic
commitment of the shareholders: share ownership. Professors Henry Hu
and Bernard Black noted that these days, voting can be decoupled by
hedging, which “affects economic ownership”29 of the shares. Voting
can also be decoupled from ownership by borrowing voting shares and
reserving the right to vote them.30 In a hedging case, the lender has “undisclosed economic ownership accompanied by informal voting rights.”31
And in the share-borrowing case, the vote buyer has “more votes than
economic ownership.”32
Professors Hu and Black outline various ways in which this decoupling can be effected.33 One way is by enabling one person to borrow
shares owned by another. “Under standard lending arrangements, the
borrower has voting rights but no economic ownership, while the lender
has economic ownership without voting rights.”34 Thus, the borrower of
the shares has voting rights for payment that is far lower than the price of
buying the shares. Such lending can be done pro forma by buying voting
shares and selling them immediately thereafter. The risk of ownership
for a day does not match the impact of the voting on those who hold the
shares far longer.
An equity swap is another approach of decoupling votes from ownership. In this arrangement, one party, such as a pension fund, holds
shares while another person swaps to buy the shares but does not own
them yet. The buyer hopes that the price of the shares will fall and that
he would be able to buy the shares for a lower price than the higher price
that he agreed to sell the shares. The person who is holding sold shares
28. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 907 (2006).
29. Id. at 818–19.
30. Id. at 816.
31. Id. at 907.
32. Id. at 812.
33. Id. at 907.
34. Id. at 816.
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(for a fixed price) has no interest in the shares. The person who bought
the shares (but did not pay for them yet) has an interest in the vote but
not in the economic attributes of the shares. In this situation:
a person with the long equity side (the ‘equity leg’) of the swap acquires economic ownership of shares (but not voting rights) from
the short side (the ‘interest leg’). The short side often hedges its
economic risk by holding shares, thus ending up with votes but no
net economic ownership.35

Other decoupling strategies exist as well. One is relying on put and
call options or single-stock futures.36 And yet another is “soft parking.”
This technique works as follows:
One party (the ‘parkee’) holds shares and thus apparent voting
rights, but limited or no economic ownership. The parkee is informally expected to either (1) vote as another party (the ‘parker’)
would want, or informally requests, or (2) arrange, if the parker requests, to unwind the parking transaction and return the voting
rights to the parker. The parkee will often be a derivatives dealer or
bank.37

For example, a Hungarian firm, MOL, defended itself from a takeover
bid by launching a stock buyback program:
MOL had bought back nearly half (48.8%) of its own previously
outstanding shares, with 7.8% held directly and another 41% lent to
two Hungarian banks. MOL spent more than $2 billion buying itself.
Decoupling played a critical part in MOL’s defense. Under Hungarian law, a firm cannot vote its own shares. MOL avoided this limitation by lending most of the repurchased shares to the two banks.
The banks were nominally free to vote as they wished but could not
sell the shares and were widely expected to vote them as MOL
management wished.38

A voting trust is another mechanism by which the voters (the trustees) are not the true owners. However, the owners who use this mechanism have a measure of control over the voting trustee, even though
they are bound by the voting trust agreement.39 In addition, most corpo35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 638 (2008).
38. Id. at 647 (footnote omitted).
39. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 400 (1983). (“The voting trust [is] a form of irrevocable proxy in which several share-
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rate laws require the apparent shareholder to disclose that the shareholder
is a trustee. In contrast, the MOL technique leaves the voter seen as the
true owner. Tender offers have been affected by “interposing a third actor between the bidder and individual target shareholders.”40 The result
“is to require the shareholder to exercise his vote in order to remove the
impediment to his ability to sell his stock.”41 In a recent case that was
settled, vote decoupling was used by Perry Corp. to vote for a merger
without disclosing its ownership in the merging companies, Mylan Laboratories (Mylan) and King Pharmaceuticals (King). In this case, Perry
Corp. adopted a risk arbitrage spread trade involving the two companies.
In 2004, Mylan announced an agreement to acquire King, subject to the
approval of both Mylan and King shareholders. Following this announcement, Perry began acquiring Mylan voting rights and at the same
time used a short-sale hedging strategy to eliminate its financial exposure
in these shares. Perry purchased 9.89% of Mylan’s shares in foreign
markets, or after hours on the over-the-counter market, in order to vote
for the merger without publicly disclosing this purchase—disclosure of
the purchase would have lowered the spread between the price of King
and Mylan shares and would have reduced Perry’s profit.42

holders convey their shares and the attached votes to a trustee who must vote them as a bloc in accordance with instructions.”). See also id. at 410 (“Voting trusts are designed to inhibit transfers of
control. The separation of control from the residual interest introduces a substantial, and in public
firms unnecessary, agency cost.”); 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(a) (2001) (authorizing voting
trusts); Abercrombie v. Davies, 130 A.2d 338, 383–84 (Del. 1957) (voting trust not prevented by
fact that trustees are under control of shareholders).
40. Thomas J. Andre, Jr., A Preliminary Inquiry into the Utility of Vote Buying in the Market
for Corporate Control, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 533, 636 (1990).
41. Id. For an example of abuse of voting power see Sommers v. Apalachicola Northern RR
Co., 78 So. 25 (Fla. 1918). See also Eric J. Pan, Single Stock Futures and Cross-Border Access for
U.S. Investors, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 221, 253 (2008) (“In the face of growing demand by U.S.
investors for access to foreign markets and pressure to restore U.S. capital markets competitiveness,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is gradually negotiating mutual recognition arrangements with select foreign markets—arrangements that will allow foreign exchanges and brokers to operate in the United States without direct SEC oversight. . . . At 20 percent, the margins for
[these instruments] are lower than the 50 percent margin normally imposed on securities trading,
[though] higher than the margins imposed on other types of futures contracts. . . . Nonetheless, the
SEC and CFTC have refrained from using their authority to allow for [these instruments] on unregistered securities because of Section 6(h)(3)(C) which provides that the requirements for listing of
security futures products shall be no less restrictive than comparable listing standards for options
traded on a national securities exchange or national securities association registered pursuant to
Section 15A of [the Exchange Act].”) (third alteration in the original).
42. For the full settlement, see Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Perry Corp.
with Disclosure Violations in Vote Buying Scheme (July 21, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2009/2009-165.htm. On July 21, 2009, Perry Corp. settled with the SEC, agreeing to pay
a $150,000 civil penalty for its failure to disclose that it acquired more than 5% of voting equity
securities, allegedly in violation of Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act. Id.
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In a recent court case on vote decoupling, the trial judge for the
Southern District of New York found that two hedge funds violated Rule
13(d) by failing to disclose their beneficial ownership.43 In this case, the
two hedge funds identified CSX Transportation (CSX) as a target for a
leveraged buyout or a proxy fight to gain control of CSX. The hedge
funds began acquiring CSX shares (roughly 14.4%) without acquiring
voting power. To avoid disclosing that they hold more than 5% of CSX
shares (which would have required disclosure of ownership), the funds
distributed their shares among eight counterparties that were likely to
vote with the funds. CSX sued the funds and partners, alleging, among
other things, that the funds failed to disclose their beneficial ownership
of CSX. The judge held that the two hedge funds had violated the disclosure rules, mainly under the “anti-evasion” rule.44
There are other rules that can be circumvented by decoupling techniques, such as: mandatory bid rules;45 “[s]tatutory, contractual [such as
relying on put and call options or, where they exist, single-stock futures]
and other limits on voting power;”46 income tax rules;47 “[r]ecapture of
‘short-swing’ trading profits;”48 “[l]imits on short sales, or ‘margin borrowing’ against the value of shares;”49 and antitrust rules.50 Vote decoupling may be used by corporations to vote for their own stock, which
corporate law forbids.51 To the extent that the rules limit or direct voting,
vote decoupling hides the true voter and its incentives, thereby circumventing the purpose of the rules.
While the recent CSX decision might exert pressure on the Securities and Exchange Commission to enact new disclosure rules,52 a number
of corporations have already amended their bylaws to protect their shareholders from empty voters. For example, on March 27, 2008, Sara Lee
(SLE) amended its bylaws, requiring that “a shareholder who nominates
a new board member or submits a proposal that could alter the path of

43. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
44. Id.
45. Hu & Black, supra note 5, at 669.
46. Id. at 670.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 670.
50. Id. at 671.
51. Hu & Black, supra note 37, at 642–43 (“[C]orporations can use decoupling techniques to
allow insiders or other friendly third parties to vote shares with partial or no economic exposure” and
“ward off changes in control.”).
52. See Hu & Black, supra note 5, at 669 (“Whatever the outcome of the appeal, the CSX case
will likely put pressure on the SEC to adopt disclosure rules that explicitly address economic-only
ownership.”).
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the foodmaker’s business must also disclose if it has ‘hedged its ownership’ or has ‘any short position’ in the stock.”53 Similarly, on February
14, 2008, Coach (COH) amended its bylaws, “requiring that ‘any hedging activities engaged’ in by a stockholder must be divulged when a proposal is submitted.”54 These changes are believed to protect shareholders
from the dilution of their voting power by “empty voters” who have negative economic interests in the company.55
Professors Hu and Black list several motivations that drive to decoupling shares from voting. On one hand, “empty voting by insiders is
likely to facilitate entrenchment and undermine external oversight. Empty voting with negative economic interest is also troubling . . . .”56 On
the other hand:
[H]edge funds can use empty voting to influence governance at underperforming corporations. Oversight of company managers by
large shareholders is often considered to be beneficial, but is often
ineffective. Empty voting could let votes move from less to better
informed hands and, thus, could enhance the effectiveness of shareholder oversight.57

Because voting decouplings are so varied, it is difficult to evaluate
them. They can range from voting without any economic interest, to voting with an economic interest that contradicts the owners’ interest, to
voting with an economic interest that conflicts with the interests of the
chosen board of directors. The board itself might have interests that conflict with the interests of the owners. Much depends on the intentions
and performance of the parties and the effect not only on the success and
failure of the enterprise but on the financial markets. Nonetheless, and
perhaps because, voting decouplings can be both beneficial and destructive to shareholders’ ownership, the various methods of these mechanisms (and others that may be invented) should be disclosed. And if their
value is in their hidden effect, they should be disclosed to destroy this
value. Their benefits should be in their effect and the judgment of this
effect should not be left to the holders of empty votes.

53. Matt Andrejczak, Sara Lee, Coach Set Rules to Spot Shareholder Actions,
MARKETWATCH, Apr. 2, 2008, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sara-lee-coach-setrules-to-deter-devious-shareholders.
54. Id.
55. “[Sara Lee spokesperson Mike] Cummins said that the ‘interests of a stockholder who has
hedged its Sara Lee stock ownership may not align with the interests of other stockholders, so we
believe the additional information now required by the bylaws will enable all stockholders to make
better-informed decisions.’” Id.
56. Hu & Black, supra note 28, at 820.
57. Id. at 820–21 (footnotes omitted).
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C. Reverse Exchange Securities
“Reverse exchange securities” is another name for “reverse convertibles.” These securities combine into one financial asset two separate
traditional bundles of benefits and risks. The terms of this third type of
security seem complex, but after reflection, they are self-explanatory.
These assets constitute part bond and part share. While the promise of
returns is similar to a bond, the payment of the invested capital presents a
share. Figuring out the risk and benefit of such a combination becomes
complicated because the issuer of the bond part is different from the issuer of the share part. The results of the separation of ownership of these
two financial assets from the two kinds of risk that they pose are rich in
possibilities. The reverse convertible bond issuer may have far more
information about the share issuer than the buyer of the bond may have.
Reverse convertibles combine the features of debt with the features
of equity. The instruments are interest-paying—similar to debt. But the
amount lent and repaid is linked to the value of particular shares or
another event. The “reverse exchange securities,” or so-called “bonds,”
issuer does not promise to pay back the amounts the bond buyer had
paid. Instead, the bond buyer is promised on the payment date the price
of a particular equity price or the financial value of a market event, such
as future interest rates. The buyer will not gain if the stock price rises.
The issuing company will not pay more than the price to the shareholders
at the time the “bond” was issued. But if the stock price falls, the investors will lose and the issuing company will pay less—the lower price.
For example, the instruments are sold for $100 and bear 10% interest for
six months—an unusually high return. These instruments are pegged to
the price of certain equity securities at a specified date. The securities
are issued not by the “bond” issuer but by an unrelated issuer (for example, a corporation or a bank). If the price of the equity security rises, the
holder of the reverse convertible will not benefit from the rise. The
holder will be paid the $110; that is, the principal ($100) plus interest
($10). If, however, the price of the equity security is lower than the predetermined price, the holder of the reverse convertible will receive the
equity securities rather than cash. Thus, if the issuer is a corporation, the
corporation will not issue dividends to the shareholders (reflecting the
profits) but will promise a fixed and anticipated interest. However, the
amount lent is not fixed. That amount is linked to the future value of the
specified equity securities in a certain way. The “bond” holder will not
benefit from the higher price of the securities, but will have to accept the
securities themselves if their price is below the bond principal amount
($100). “The net result of this credit-enhancing relationship would be to
reduce financial constraints and hence (perceived) default risk for the
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sponsoring firm [the issuer] . . . .”58 Bondholders gain a higher interest
rate presumably to compensate for possible loss of the amount they paid
for the bonds or shares.59
Corporations use the net proceeds of the issued bonds for general
corporate purposes, including “additions to working capital, investment
in or extension of credits to [the corporation’s] subsidiaries and the repayment of indebtedness” as well as hedging.60 The instruments seem to
be used by issuers as “other capital-raising securities.” 61 The first question is whether there is sufficient data and understanding to evaluate
these instruments and anticipate the incentives of the issuer’s management. A second question is whether the information available to the issuer of the bonds concerning the securities, to which the payment of the
bond is linked, is available to the buyers. Finally, it could be that the
issuer of the “bond” can also affect the price of the other entity’s shares;
for example, if the issuer is a significant lender of the company or sold
its shares short and hopes for the price of the shares to fall.
D. Securitization and Structured Finance
Securitization is a process by which individual and unmarketable
debts or loans are pooled and converted into marketable securities. The
process starts with debt creation such as loans, future lawyer fees, lease
payments, or credit card receivables. The next step is the creation of an
institutional intermediary, such as a trust, a corporation, or a limited
partnership, called a Special Purpose Vehicle (“SPV”) or a Special Purpose Entity (“SPE”). The third step is the transfer of the debt to the SPV.
The fourth step is the issuance of securities by the SPV. The securities
entitle the owners to a portion of the cash-flow from the aggregate debt
held by the SPV.62
The decoupling in securitization is similar to the reverse exchange securities: both are decoupling by coupling. They combine
debt and equity. But while the reverse exchange securities combine debt
58. Bruce A. Benet et al., Gains from Structured Product Markets: The Case of ReverseExchangeable Securities (RES), 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 111, 125 (2006). See, e.g., id. app. A.
59. Id. at 114. Such instruments were issued by ABN-AMRO Bank, a leading financial institution based in the Netherlands. Id.
60. Id. at 125 (quoting the REX.S prospectus).
61. Id. at 125 (“RES are somewhat more attractive to issue than straight debt. When issuing
straight debt, for example, the firm must reward investors for default risk (i.e., the risk it may not be
able to make full face value repayment at maturity). In the case of RES, however, we conjecture that
default risk may well be lower than for comparable ABN-AMRO bonds. . . . [There can be] a significant positive correlation between RES repayment obligations and sponsoring firm cash flows at
liability expiration.”).
62. See generally 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION § 6.3 (Ann Taylor Schwing ed., 2d ed.
2005).
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and equity into one security, securitization transforms debts into securities. In both cases, the difficulty of evaluating the level of risk of the
debt is compounded by the difficulty of evaluating the risk of the securities which represent portions of the debts. In both, risk and ownership
are decoupled.
Securitization provides many benefits. It allows enterprises that
need capital to borrow not only from the banks but also from investors in
the markets. It also allows borrowing enterprises to provide investors a
lower-risk debt by separating the borrowers businesses, which can be
risky, from the debts due to these borrowers from their customers (which
may be far less risky). For example, while construction firms can be
risky enterprises, if their income is based on rentals of apartment houses,
the rentals may be far safer than the construction business. Securitization
enables the business enterprise to raise funds by transferring the right to
the rentals and mortgages on the real estate to investors and, thereby,
borrow at a lower rate.63
Yet, securitization may pose, for investors, a somewhat greater risk
because the underlying debt is difficult to evaluate. In reverse exchange
securities, the issuer is one source of risk and the issuer of the securities
or the market event is another. In securitization, because the debt is varied, it may be more difficult to evaluate the risk associated with the cash
flow of the aggregate debt. In the past, rating agencies have assigned the
level of risk to securities issued by the SPVs. The rating was sometimes
required by law.64 But the risk of the debts rose with the pressures to sell
more asset backed securities.65
When banks and unregulated entities made mortgage loans and
pooled them into SPVs that issued securities, their profits derived not
from the interest of the debt they held, but by charging intermediation
costs of lending, structuring the securitization, or both. Hence, the creators of debt securities for sale had incentive to produce as many securities as possible. Structures became very complex, and the rating agencies functioned under conflicts of interest: they were paid by the issuers
of the securities that they rated. Consequently, a bubble was created in
SPV issued securities based on low quality mortgage loans. At some
point, the bubble in mortgage backed securities exploded (as all bubbles
do). The year 2008 saw the decline in real estate prices, the drying up of

63. Id. at 212–13.
64. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (2009) (exempting SPVs from the regulation of the Investment Company Act of 1940, and imposing a condition of rating on the SPVs’ assets).
65. However, as the economic crisis has shown, the rating agencies’ ratings did not reflect this
increased risk, causing securities such as mortgage-backed securities to be overvalued.

948

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:4

the market in securitized mortgages, and the adverse effect on the financial system and economy.66
The trend in the financial markets has been toward the freedom to
design and slice benefits, risks, and controls or powers (the contract part
in the financial assets), and to create markets to trade in them (the market
part in the financial assets). Legally, one would redefine the trend as the
freedom to design various rights and liabilities for trading in open or restricted markets. These tendencies were encouraged based on the assumption that market prices of financial assets closely reflect the state of
the economy and are more accurate than any other valuation. It was also
assumed that markets are preferable to institutional intermediation, such
as banks and insurance companies. Institutions may give the impression
of low risk. Their structure, however, is usually risky. If they fail, they
present significant risks to the financial system. In addition, it was assumed that market regulation, mostly by disclosure, is preferable to government substantive regulation. Even speculation is preferable to fixed
values that do not reflect reality as much as the markets do.
These assumptions were flawed.67 Market prices did not reflect the
state of the economy but rather a bubble, rising high in part because of
securities sales forces’ drives and benefits. With the bubble rise, markets
have not proven a preferable intermediary as compared to institutional
intermediaries. When institutional intermediaries became active in the
markets as market intermediaries, both the institutions’ and markets’ stability seemed to be harmed. Thus, some argue that the optimal structure
of a financial system is separate markets and institutional intermediaries
in clear competition among the two segments. The assumption that regulation is unnecessary, and if it is necessary, it should follow the “markets,” has proven to be less than perfect.68 Competition did not lead to
greater efficiency or more balanced markets. On the contrary, it seems to
have produced excesses that led to a crash. The regulators’ “hands off”
attitude seems to have allowed a tremendous bubble and its inevitable
crash that has hit not only the financial system but the economy as well.
Whether regulation could have prevented this disaster is, of course, de66. See TAMAR FRANKEL & MARK FAGAN, LAW AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
SECURITIZATION AND ASSET BACKED SECURITIES: LAW, PROCESS, CASE STUDIES, AND
SIMULATIONS 88–99, 148–54 (2009).
67. See The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing of the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan, former
Chairman, Fed. Reserve). In response to a question by Chairman Waxman regarding whether Dr.
Greenspan’s free, competitive markets philosophy led him to make decisions he wishes he had not
made, Dr. Greenspan responded, “[Y]es, I’ve found a flaw. . . . That’s precisely the reason I was
shocked, because I had been going for 40 years or more with very considerable evidence that [my
ideology] was working exceptionally well.” Id.
68. See, e.g., id.
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batable because we cannot reproduce the alterative scenario of a regulatory regime.
In March 2010, Judge Richard Posner wrote a very thoughtful article which suggests that the main focus of the law should be making
banks less affected by the collapse of other financial intermediaries. He
argued that we should make “banks safe by confining them to their traditional activities, mainly the lending of federally insured deposits to small
businesses and consumers and the purchase of federal and state government securities.”69 The judge suggests a structural change to follow the
functional purpose of banks and regulating other lenders. “Combining
safe and risky financial activities in the same firm,” wrote Judge Posner,
“endangers safety.” Therefore, he suggests not shrinking the banks but
requiring them and their managements to be absolutely risk averse.70
Does this discussion veer us from the issue of ownership and control as well as decoupling of ownership from control? To some extent it
does, if we focus only on the corporate universe. However, investors in
asset-backed securities have been separated from the source of their income and capital as well. Only this source is not an individual or group
of power holders. This source is the intermediaries who take no ownership and no control. This is the ultimate decoupling not only of those
who own from those who owe but mainly from those who designed the
system, benefited from the design, and left the losses to both the lenders
(the investors) and the borrowers. Thus, in looking for solutions to
strengthen the ownership from control we must consider the system as a
whole. Judge Posner’s article focuses on the intermediaries and, in following Berle and Means’s ideas, we should not ignore this context as
well.
III. WHAT COULD BE DONE TO AVOID THE PROBLEMS THAT ARISE
FROM DECOUPLING AND COUPLING WHILE MAINTAINING THEIR
BENEFITS?
A. Does Decoupling Undermine the Traditional Property-Type
Protections?
“Property-type protections” are the legal protections of property
owners or shareholders. Some types of decoupling undermine the traditional property-type protections at a certain stage of the decoupling
process. For example, when derivatives cover various risks of an enterprise, they might reduce an enterprise risk. Therefore, even if ownership
69. Richard Posner, In Volcker We Trust, AM. LAW., Mar. 2010, at 53, 54.
70. Id. at 80.
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and control of the enterprise are separate, the enterprise provides owners
with benefits with lower risks (minus management costs). Hence, Professors Gilson and Whitehead suggest that because such derivatives produce ownership without risk, “property-type protections” for the owners
are not justified; shareholders not bearing risk should not be entitled to
voting rights and other controls over management.
However, if the risk coverage is itself risky, then the question of
property-type protection rises again. Property-type protection by risk
coverage can be a mirage. If the promises of risk coverage are not solidly backed, and if no regulation covers the promisors or enforces their
obligations in any other way, the risk transfers and “protections” are
empty promises. As noted, historically, coverage promises were based
on faulty calculations and assumptions. The owners could not and cannot evaluate the risk coverage at a reasonable cost. In fact, the very nature of financial assets undermines traditional property-type protections.
Promises cannot be touched, seen, checked upon receipt, or tested for
reliability. The reliability of promises depends on the promisors’ ability
and tendency to honor their obligations. In addition, the ability of promisors to honor their promises depends on future—mostly unpredictable—
events affecting the promisors and their promises. The events in the
years 2008 and 2009 suggest that market trading in risk-covering promises needs strengthening. This conclusion is reflected in the congressional and regulatory proposals that are currently being considered.71 As
the 2008 crash demonstrated, risk protection has not been what it seemed
to be. Hence, owner protection should be strengthened rather than weakened.
The danger that controlling parties without ownership will adopt
risks at the expense of the owners and the financial system is greater than
imagined. Protections of owners and the system are weaker than imagined. Thus, the owner protections should be tighter, not lighter. In
addition, the assumption that an ability to cover the issuing enterprises’
risks reduces the risks of the enterprise-shareholders is flawed. Shareholders are always the last to get paid. They are paid after the Internal
Revenue Service, the employees, the managers, the creditors and other
claimants. Therefore, the suggestion that shareholder voting and other
protective rights against those who control their money and assets should
be weakened is not convincing.
In addition, shareholders bear not only the enterprise’s risks, but also the risk that the controlling managers might abuse their power and

71. See, e.g., Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009, H.R. 3795, 111th Cong.,
available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/titleVII.pdf.
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misappropriate the shareholder assets. Therefore, even if derivatives
protect the shareholders against enterprise risk, derivatives do not protect
the shareholders from misappropriation of their property by management.
This issue is fundamental. America is a capitalistic country. The
issue is not one of enterprise risk, but one of entitlement to ownership of
the enterprise assets. Those who own have the right to ultimate control
and to the residual profits. Those who serve, no matter how able, creative, productive and innovative they are, do not and should not have ultimate control and right to ownership. Similarly, even if lenders bear
high risk of loss, they are not entitled to the control or the residual profits
of the enterprise. If low risk is linked to lower control, the rationale is
that there would be lower concern that controlling managers will abuse
their power. Unfortunately that has not been the case. Besides, the United States could end up with managers—those who serve—as owners.
This result is a different societal structure than capitalism. Regardless of
how high or low a risk the financiers of enterprises pose, they, and not
those who manage the enterprises, must have ultimate control. Otherwise, we will move to a system where service substitutes for capital.
Other decouplings, such as “naked voting rights,” undermine
property-type protections for owners. These techniques hand control
to those who do not bear ownership risk and have no fiduciary duties to
owners or to the aggregate of owners. In these cases, traditional property-type protections disappear altogether. Empty voting rights can be held
by those who reap benefits from control at the risk of others and gain
from destroying current ownership of the enterprise. These are the situations which have been, and should be prohibited altogether—perhaps
with the exception of a voting trust and full disclosure of the possible use
of the votes.72
Reverse exchange securities open the door to the weakening of
ownership. First, they may mislead debtors into believing that they have
a bond instead of a share. Most critically, those who take the risk of a
share have no iota of the control or protections that accompany ownership. In addition, these holds take the pure risk of the ownership of the
shares and none of the benefits. These “bonds” operate as Berle and

72. Interview with Nicholas Valerio III, associate professor of finance at Emory University’s
Goizueta Business School, Risk, the Derivatives Market, & Proposed Regulatory Reforms: What’s
Ahead?, (July 16, 2009), http://knowledge.emory.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1247. Currently, when
listed derivatives are traded, there are mechanisms to reduce this risk, such as clearing corporations,
margin requirements (i.e., a financial deposit), and price discovery (which can occur in the public
market). Id. In OTC markets, each party has burden of identifying the financial stability of the other
and “there is no pricing transparency, nor centralized reporting.” Id.
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Means’s ultimate model: ownership losses, but no benefits and no control.
Securitization undermines property-type protections in another
way. Those who create the financial assets that end up in the hands of
owners have little interest in reducing the risks from these assets, and a
strong incentive to hide the risks and sell the assets as high quality assets.
The ultimate owners incur high costs in determining the risk involved in
the assets. In addition, securitization undermines the traditional property-type protection to the extent that the owners are unable to negotiate
with the source of the payments—the borrowers—and no managers exist
to account and answer for the shoddy assets or negotiate with the borrowers. The creators and sellers of risky financial assets have incentives
to avoid and hide the risk. In all of these cases, unless there are different
types of protections, owners remain with no or weakened protections. In
securitization, the connection between the borrowers, the promisors, and
the owners of the promises is severed. In fact, the process of securitization closely resembles mutual funds, except that this process is unregulated. In securitization, it seems that no one has full voting rights. There
is no party that can negotiate changes in the terms of the borrowers’
loans. The bankruptcy of millions of borrowers is an inefficient form of
renegotiation.
The only stable indicators of decoupling seem to be short-term
benefits for intermediaries (the innovators) and, perhaps, for owners
that continuously trade in the asset backed securities. Long-term
owners, even sophisticated owners, are less able to evaluate the risk of
decoupled and re-coupled financial assets. For example, in the case of
market instruments that combine bonds and equity, the owners cannot
discover the use of these instruments and current regulation does not require the sellers or issuers to disclose their other financial positions and
future seemingly unrelated activities. Had this information been available, owners would have understood their risk and thus eliminated the
benefits gained by the issuers, the sellers, and the innovators.
B. Does Decoupling Warrant More Regulation?
Not all de-couplings require more regulation but some require
enforcement of the current law. For example, abuse of control without
risk, which is demonstrated by vote buying or renting (or a “second
length ownership”), need not involve new regulation. Rather, vote buying is prohibited in corporate law and in the political arena. In the case
of decouplings that result in the same separation, it was allowed perhaps
because the vote buying involved market transactions (for example, borrowing). “Empty voting” should not be allowed and can be easily prohi-
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bited by applying current legal principles. The prohibition on vote buying in the political arena should apply to any vote-ownership without
ownership, no matter how it is acquired, so long as it is not accompanied
by owner risk and rewards. No payment should be allowed for any vote
of any corporation unless accompanied by ownership. And just as voting
trusts require disclosure, so should similar arrangements in decoupling.
Addressing past innovations may help, but only in part. Some
past innovations, especially those that caused significant losses, will not
be repeated soon; other innovations will emerge. To be sure, regulation
increases the cost for all intermediaries and reduces their profits. However, as recent events have shown, market competition does not work to
prevent abuse. Intermediaries are unlikely to compete for lower fees or
on strengthening property-protections.
In addition, so long as innovations are used in one-to-one relationships, a regulatory reform is more costly and not as necessary.
So long as innovations are used in one-to-one relationships, there is lower payoff for regulatory reform, unless the owners sustain significant
losses from the innovations and seek to escape the financial system for a
shorter or longer period. This escape can bring down the system. Innovations used in the markets might cause significant failure as well. Unless promises are kept, a “run” on the promisees or on the promisors is
likely.
The ultimate payoff for a regulatory reform is higher if the owner
losses affect the entire financial system (or the economy). When owners
may sustain sufficiently great losses, they might seek to escape the financial system for a shorter or longer period. This escape can dry up the
markets and bring down the system. Effective regulation might reduce
the risks of innovations, but not necessarily. Regulators may exercise
judgment in evaluating the dangers from the innovations and allow some
with or without conditions. In addition, regulation imposes costs, and
these should be related to the cost-benefit analysis of regulation.
Regulation of derivative over-the-counter markets (“OTC”)
must be, and is likely to be, tightened. This regulation will help assure
the enforcement of promises, either by the government (threat) or by the
group of derivative traders (having “skin” in the risk created by others).
In her testimony before the House Committee on Agriculture, SEC
Chairman Mary L. Schapiro noted: “The derivatives market has grown
enormously since the late 1990s to approximately $450 trillion of outstanding notional amount in June 2009.”73 This market presents systemic
73. Testimony Concerning the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 Before the
H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts092209mls.htm.
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risk (e.g., risk concentration by significant leverage). The markets “behave unexpectedly in times of crisis.”74 While “credit default swaps
(CDS) . . . can reduce certain types of risk, [they can] caus[e] others, . . .
heightened by the lack of regulatory oversight of dealers and other participants in this market.”75 The result can be “inadequate capital and risk
management standards. . . . OTC derivatives markets directly affect the
regulated securities and futures markets by serving as a less regulated
alternative for engaging in economically equivalent activity.”76 This can
lead to “a flow of funds out of the regulated markets and into the unregulated shadow markets. . . . These issues must be addressed, and I am
committed to working closely with this Committee, the Congress, the
Administration, and the CFTC to close this gap and restore a sound
structure for U.S. financial regulation.”77 The Administration’s bill
“would mandate clearing and trading of all standard over-the-counter
products, and setting capital and margin requirements for dealers.”78
There is a proposal to create one central clearing house for trading standardized derivatives which will guarantee performance. This entity
should be able to manage risk by daily cash margins.79 Other proposals
to improve disclosure and operational processes “have been tried before
with limited success.”80

74. Id.
75. Id. (“For example, CDS permit individual firms to obtain or reduce credit risk exposure to a
single company or a sector, thereby reducing or increasing that risk. In addition to obtaining or reducing exposure to credit risk, a CDS contract participant will take on counterparty and liquidity risk
from the other side of the CDS. Through CDS, financial institutions and other market participants
can shift credit risk from one party to another, and thus the CDS market may be relevant to a particular firm’s willingness to participate in an issuer’s securities offering or to lend to a firm. However,
CDS can also lead to greater systemic risk by, among other things, concentrating risk in a small
number of large institutions and facilitating lax lending standards more generally.”).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Sarah N. Lynch, CFTC’s Gensler Calls for Broad OTC Derivatives Regulations (Sept 14,
2009), http://www.fxstreet.com/news/forex-news/article.aspx?StoryId=c5966843-5823-4896-b13180b35876387e (“The bill would give the [Commodity Futures Trading Commission] and the [SEC]
joint authority to patrol the markets and set capital requirements in some cases for non-bank derivative dealers. Regulators would also collect detailed information about the trading of customized
products as well.”).
79. See, e.g., Posting of Yves Smith to Naked Capitalism, Satyajit Das Weighs In on OTC
Derivatives Proposals and Finds Them Wanting, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/07/satyajitdas-weighs-in-on-otc.html (July 17, 2009, 1:36 a.m.) (quoting Das) (“Failure to meet a margin call
requires the [central counterparty] to close out the position and offset any losses against existing
collateral. The level of initial collateral posted must cover the fall in value from the last margin call.
Traders want the maximum amount of leverage by reducing the amount [they post in cash].”)
80. Id. (quoting Das).
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Focusing on the OTC,81 the Treasury suggested derivative regulation by “[r]equiring central clearing and exchange trading of standardized OTC derivatives; . . . higher capital and margin requirements for
non-standardized derivatives; . . . [b]roadening the definition of standardized OTC derivatives;”82 and “ensuring that OTC derivatives are not
marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties.”83 This proposal
emphasizes the regulation and oversight of speculation.84 In September
23, 2009, Senator Jack Reed introduced the Comprehensive Derivatives
Regulation Act of 2009. The Act would:
[c]lear standardized credit default swaps (CDS) and other unregulated derivatives through a clearinghouse . . . and allow regulators to
oversee new derivatives products that may arise in the future;
[e]stablish robust capital and margin requirements for derivatives
dealers and other major market participants, and establish higher
standards for derivatives products not traded on clearinghouses; establish new conduct, recordkeeping and reporting requirements for
firms, intended to protect investors from abusive practices and provide regulators and investors with extensive information regarding
derivatives transactions and positions across the financial sector;
[p]rovide regulators with new authority to set position limits and
oversee the marketing of derivatives products to unsophisticated investors, and . . . combat fraud and manipulation . . . .85

There are several suggestions to strengthen the Treasury’s proposal.86
Promoting market integrity. Gary Gensler noted that there is a
need to “promote greater market integrity and improve market transpa-

81. Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009, H.R. 3795, 111th Cong., available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regulatoryreform/titleVII.pdf.
82. Posting of Anjali Desai to Financial Markets Blog, U.S. Treasury Delivers Proposed Legislation on OTC Derivatives to Congress, http://www.alston.com/financialmarketscrisisblog/blo
g.aspx?entry=2433 (Aug. 12, 2009, 10:19 p.m.).
83. Id.
84. Id. The Treasury proposed amendments in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and other
relevant acts. See also Posting of Anjali Desai to Financial Markets Blog, U.S. Treasury Announces
Proposed Regulatory Framework for OTC Derivatives, http://www.alston.com/financialmarkets
crisisblog/blog.aspx?entry=2077 (May 13, 2009, 7:07 p.m.).
85. Posting of Anjali Desai to Financial Markets Blog, Senator Reed Introduces Comprehensive Derivatives Regulation Act of 2009, http://www.alston.com/financialmarketscrisisblog
/?entry=2585 (Sept. 23, 2009, 5:51 p.m.). In response, market participants expressed concerns about
increased regulatory costs. See, e.g., Posting of Christy Prendergast to Financial Markets Blog,
House Committee Holds Hearings on Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives,
http://www.alston.com/financialmarketscrisisblog/blog.aspx?entry=2584 (Sept. 23, 2009, 5:28 p.m.).
86. See, e.g., Testimony Concerning the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009
Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, supra note 73.
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rency.”87 He pointed to two regimes—one regulating derivatives dealers,
and the other regulating the derivatives markets.88 This can be done by
“extend[ing] the regulatory regimes of the Commodity Exchange Act
(“CEA”) and the federal securities laws,” thus covering the entire marketplace.89
Professor Mark Roe focused on the intermediaries’ incentives. He
noted that “[d]erivatives, repos and financial swaps . . . protect against
foreign exchange and interest rate fluctuations . . . and in guarantees
against loan defaults” obtain a favorable treatment in bankruptcy law.90
“It has been a successful lobbying effort for this part of the American
financial industry: priority treatment is important for the industry, but not
well enough understood to engage much public attention beyond the financial press.”91 Professor Roe argues against this favoritism. The favored treatment is so great, he wrote, that “financial players can set up
deals so that they beat all other creditors if the other side of the deal goes
bankrupt.”92 Professor Roe predicts that if these instruments are not
awarded this favored treatment, the “players . . . will act differently. If
they know that their payments from a counterparty might be clawed back
if the counterparty goes bankrupt, they will keep a sharper eye on the
solvency of their counterparties, because a lower priority will not hurt
them as long as their counterparties stay solvent.”93
The states’ regulation of derivatives is a hybrid of institutional and
functional regulation causing “intense legal and jurisdictional uncertainty
and high regulatory compliance costs.” 94 Yet, not all firms or derivatives must be regulated. One regulator is not necessarily better than multiple regulators, and functional regulation is not inherently preferable to
institutional regulation.95 Other academics suggested in a 1994 article
that the public policy rationale for increasing the regulation of derivatives has “little or no economic basis. . . . Derivatives do not pose great-

87. Gary Gensler, Thoughts on Comprehensive Market Regulation, (Sept. 23, 2009),
http://www.commodityonline.com/news/Thoughts-on-comprehensive-market-regulation-21352-31.html.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Mark Roe, End Bankruptcy Priority for Derivatives, Repos and Swaps, FT.COM, Dec. 15,
2009,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16da702e-ea41-11de-aeb6-00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1
(last updated Dec. 16, 2009).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Christopher Culp, Derivatives Regulation: Problems and Prospects, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Mar. 31, 1998, http://cei.org/gencon/005,01275.cfm.
95. Id.
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er risk than other financial activities.”96 There are no unique risks to users of derivatives. And in 1994, the regulatory framework was adequate.
Institutional and functional regulation existed. This bifurcated framework renders derivatives regulation complex. This observation is probably true when one ignores human incentive and the division of risk and
return.
Fiduciary law imposes on money managers and corporate managers a duty of care. The two cases discussed below suggest that “regulation cannot substitute for sound management practices. At the same
time, government policymakers can act to minimize the potential for disruption to financial markets by promoting laws and policies that minimize legal risk.”97 “In 1992, MGRM [a subsidiary of MG] began implementing an aggressive marketing program in which it offered long-term
price guarantees on deliveries of gasoline, heating oil, and diesel fuels
for up to five or ten years.”98 The program included innovative contracts
which MGRM hedged. This hedging program would have generated
huge losses under certain conditions. When the conditions occurred,
MG’s board moved quickly, removed the top manager and took other
arguably hasty actions.99 In the second case, Barings Bank perished because one of its unsupervised traders speculated and produced enormous
losses.100 Both cases involve exchange-traded derivatives contracts, and
in both cases, senior management has been criticized for lack of strict
supervision. Yet the two managements reacted differently. MG’s management has been faulted “for overreacting to the large margin calls
faced by one of its subsidiaries . . . .”101 “Barings’s management has
been faulted for being overly complacent in the face of a large number of
warning signs.”102
In both cases, management should have better understood their activities and their risks.103 In MG’s case, “the sheer scale of its U.S. oil
subsidiary’s marketing program exposed the firm to large risks. Although there is a great deal of disagreement over the efficacy of the
hedging strategy employed by [MG],”104 it seems that MG’s board failed
96. Christopher L. Culp, Regulating Derivatives: The Current System and Proposed Changes,
4 REGULATION 38, 38 (1994), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv17n4/v17n44.pdf.
97. Anatoli Kuprianov, Derivatives Debacles: Case Studies of Large Losses in Derivatives
Markets, ECON. Q., Fall 1995, at 1.
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 5–8.
100. Id. at 21–25.
101. Id. at 35.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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to fully appreciate “the nature or magnitude of the risks”105 and should
“not have been so shocked.”106 In Barings’s case, management allowed a
single trader to control the trading and the back office (which was supposed to act as control of the trades). The management seemed to have
believed that the trader could earn such huge profits without risks.107
“[R]egulation cannot substitute for sound management practices. At the
same time, government policymakers can act to minimize the potential
for disruption to financial markets by promoting laws and policies that
minimize legal risk.” 108
Therefore, the management’s duty of care should become stricter and carry far more enforcement in the future than it currently
does. Alternatively, or in addition, management should share in the risk
it creates for shareholders. Regulation may impose on management part
of the risk that it imposes on the owners who have entrusted their money
to these managers. A similar rule should apply to brokers, dealers, analysts, rating agencies, and other financial market intermediaries. If they
spread risk, they should take advantage of the gains, but they should also
always share in the losses. The higher their gains, the higher their part of
the losses should be.109 The pain would be a good control mechanism for
risk-taking. If intermediaries who control have close to no economic
incentive to protect owners against risks of losses, then disclosure and
the imposition of fiduciary duties may not be enough.110
To be sure, as fiduciaries, these intermediaries must be accountable.
However, in an intermediaries’ culture that values self-gratification and
intermediaries’ creativity, disclosure and feeble remedies on breach of
fiduciary duties may not be enough. Therefore, self-interest should be
used to impose a shared risk of loss. Brokers who sold auction notes as
cash, without understanding how the notes work, should be paid in such
notes, and own a portion of their assets in such notes. Managers of broker-dealer institutions that employed these brokers should own the notes
they enable their brokers to sell. The percentage of the ownership should
be reasonable and not merely symbolic.111
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 36.
109. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (2006) (prohibiting performance fees under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940).
110. See, e.g., Charles Davi, How to Understand the Derivatives Market, ATLANTIC, July 16,
2009 (discussing market makers, the buy and sell side of derivative trading, and inter-dealer trading),
available at http://business.theatlantic.com/2009/07/understanding_the_otc_derivatives_ market.php.
111. This idea is not new. At the beginning of the 1900s, corporate law took into consideration
“directors’ qualifying shares.” Directors had to own the corporations’ shares which they managed.
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Regulations of specific innovations are likely to differ. After all,
not all couplings and decouplings pose the same type and magnitude of
problems and risks to the financial system. Optimal regulation should
encourage innovations but control excesses and abuse that might threaten
the financial system and the economy. After all, everything good that
sustains us, such as food and water, can be deadly as well. Therefore, the
issue is not only the choice between “free markets” and “regulation.”
The issue is mainly: where do the real problems reside and how should
they be addressed?
Regulation should govern situations in which self-protection by
owners and market actors’ advice has proven to be faulty. Innovations may increase the cost of information for owners. If the cost is too
high, owners will rely on others to evaluate the benefits and risks of the
innovations. If the others prove to be unreliable, such as the rating agencies in the case of sub-prime mortgages, a “run” by the owners is more
likely, and regulation is necessary to restore the owners’ belief and trust.
Further, regulation provides owners with a feeling of assurance that the
intermediaries and managers, who hold owners’ money and assets, will
not greatly abuse their entrustment and will balance risk and returns well.
Therefore, the owners are less vigilant in protecting themselves from
abuse by those who hold and manage their money and assets. When disclosure is either ineffective or extremely undesirable to the innovations,
substantive regulation may be the solution. However, without enforcement, these regulations on which owners will rely might produce no supervision at all.
Some innovations can be beneficial to intermediaries and toxic
to the owners. The United States has nurtured the financial system by
feeding its intermediaries. This country has been the leader in financial
system innovations and has increased the size of its financial system. It
converted production into financial services and sales. The highest paid
persons in the United States are financial intermediaries and managers of
financial and corporate enterprises that have grown by acquisitions and
borrowing.112 Tax and other incentives have enticed Americans to trade
The qualifying shares dwindled to one cent or one dollar, and the requirement was omitted altogether. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1.2a (2000).
112. See, e.g., TARP Oversight: Is TARP Working for Main Street?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of Dean Baker, Co-Director, Center for Economic and Policy Research)
(“bank executives . . . are among the highest paid people in the country”); Floyd Norris, Wall Street
Paychecks May Wither, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at 1B (“[I]nvestment banks, not to mention
hedge funds and private equity funds, pay far better than companies in other industries.”); Posting of
David to Business Pundit, 12 Highest Paid People of 2009, http://www.businesspundit.com/12highest-paid-people-of-2009 (Dec. 28, 2009) (stating that highest-paid person is co-founder of a
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in financial assets.113 Savings have been channeled to the financial system.114 Not surprisingly, the United States has been the leader of the
2008 bubble and crash. It is unclear whether nurturing the system, innovations of whatever kind, and high payment to its leaders is beneficial to
the country and its owners. Thus, innovations may be toxic but innovators and their partners have no incentive to limit the innovations’ potential harm. This is where regulation and enforcement must interfere.
In addition, regulation affects not only current benefits and
costs. Regulation or absence of regulation affects the pattern of actors’
behavior—their habits and values. Thus, regulation is successful when it
allows innovations but monitors and evaluates them not only by market reactions but also by non-market actors who focus on the risk from
innovations to the system as a whole. Rewards for low risk might preclude some innovations, but also protect against disastrous system failures. If the innovations share some of the pain of these disasters, they
may be the best regulators and enforcers of the problem.
C. Where Is Decoupling Headed?115
One might speculate rather than purport to predict. Focusing on the
actors’ incentives, one strong indication can be derived from the benefits
of innovations to investors. Creating most such innovations involves less
expense than creating innovations in real assets. I therefore expect decoupling to continue, subject to limitations by law. Owners and financial
intermediaries (as well as those who are hired or financed by intermediaries) will gain short-term. Long-term owners, however, will bear future
risks. These risks may be hidden or seem lower than they turn out to be
and cannot be measured accurately in magnitude and time.
From Banks to Markets. I expect financial intermediaries to press
very hard for moving from institutional intermediation—such as banks
and insurance—to market intermediation—such as investment banks,
underwriters, broker dealers, and various financial advisers. In fact,
private-equity firm; second-highest is CEO of a technology firm; fourth-highest is CEO of petroleum
firm).
113. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 163 (2006 & Supp. I 2007), as amended by American Recovery and
Investment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1232, 123 Stat. 115, 341 (providing deduction for
interest paid or accrued on indebtedness); 26 U.S.C. §§ 860A-860G (2006) (granting special tax
treatment for real estate mortgage investment conduits).
114. E.g., Too Big to Fail? The Role of Antitrust Law in Government-Funded Consolidation in
the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Courts and Competition Policy Subcomm. of the H. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of William Askew, Senior Policy Advisor, Financial
Services Roundtable) (stating his belief that savings flowing into financial system was one of several
factors causing the credit crisis).
115. Robert Ahdieh asked these questions at the conference held on November 7, 2009 at
Seattle University School of Law.
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banks will seek both government cheap money and the freedom to trade
in the markets. Market intermediaries can innovate more freely, but the
combined market and banking intermediaries might see new unexpected
innovations, as securitization has demonstrated.
If the financial sector continues to be profitable, it will grow
both in assets and talent. Even though not all talented young persons
will be drawn to the financial sector, a sufficient number of talented persons who seek money will. It may well be that financial intermediation
will spread to producers and sales organizations, and they might slice and
dice promises through new and different means. “Risk protection” kinds
of derivatives will also continue to spread, bringing immediate specific
income for promises to cover risk that is less ascertained.
Intermediaries will press to eliminate the current differences
between various financial assets (promises). The differences between
equity and debt, ownership and fiduciary entrustment, private market and
public market, risk and benefits, guarantees, insurance, and rating may
all disappear. Instead of costly information, we might be offered mathematical formulas or letters, numerical evaluations, and measurements
of benefits and risk. Regulation might be substantive, focusing on the
ability of the issuers and intermediaries to meet their promises. Admittedly, in the short-term, this scenario is theoretical. Humans are the captives of habit. Institutions do not change fast, regardless of exciting innovations.
More likely, financial innovations will be supervised with greater care, both within the institutions that create and buy them, and by
the government. We will continue to follow the same principles, and
perhaps impose on the promisors a greater burden to protect the promises
from significant risks. There are no signs of imposing specialization on
financial intermediaries, such as the Glass-Steagall Act.116 But, the future may be entirely different.
D. What Regulation Can We Expect for Current Decouplings?
When are disclosure and the imposition of fiduciary duties sufficient to curb decoupling abuse, if ever? Professors Hu and Black
proposed enhanced disclosure of economic ownership (or lack of ownership), following generally the recent regulation in England and Hong
116. Even Allan Sloan, who berated bank managers in his column on January 19, 2010, and
suggested that large institutions should split their safe and risky activities into separate operations,
did not mention the Glass-Steagall Act. Presumably, market intermediaries grew at the expense of
the banks, and the new financial institutions should be small, but also competitive. See Allan Sloan,
Let Wall Street Run Wild, Without My Money, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2010, at A12, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/18/AR2010011803175.html.
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Kong.117 “[L]arge shareholder disclosure under Schedule 13D or 13G
focuses on voting ownership.”118 Whether disclosure would enable market purchasers to understand what they are buying is questionable.119
Indeed, complex instruments, described in Part Two, may perhaps be
regulated by disclosure. After a conference on March 23, 2009, FINRA
decided to issue an investor alert on reverse convertibles:120 “The shortterm structures pay a monthly coupon and return investor principal in the
underlying stock if it has fallen by a certain amount. They have [always]
been the dominant product in the US market, . . . but have been heavily
punished by falling equity markets, with the majority returning principal
in stock over recent months.”121 “[FINRA] is treading carefully given
the circumstances and what has happened in the industry. . . . This is
why it is communicating with investors rather than developing a new
enforcement.”122 FINRA is “trying not to fan the flames, and to get investors through the difficult period that they are facing,” and is concerned “over disclosure in the offering material that accompanied notes
and the suitability of the individuals who are investing in the structures.”123
Should similar regulation apply to contracts and property?
Decoupling should be divided into agreements among discrete parties
that are aware of each other before they enter the agreements and trade in
promises. In both this case and in market trading, the parties could employ brokers. In the markets, however, parties know the brokers rather
than the identity of the other parties. Knowing one’s counterparty should
be the dividing line and test between contract and market transactions.
Attempts to hide, let alone hiding, the trades of agreements should be a
criminal offense. While agreements may be left to contract law subject
117. Hu & Black, supra note 28, at 879–80.
118. Id. at 882.
119. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 156 (2006)
(“While the philosophy of disclosure may offer certain advantages for regulating the securities market, reliance on disclosure regulation alone raises broader questions about the law’s dependence on
rational choice models of decision-making. The belief that disclosure is beneficial, and the emphasis
on ensuring that accurate information is available to the public, rests on the assumption that investors
are rational, competent actors who are capable of circumspectly processing the information. It would
make no sense to insist that risks be disclosed if we did not assume that people could rationally
weigh the costs and benefits of risky alternatives and select the optimal choice. However, . . . evidence suggests that this assumption may be somewhat misguided.”).
120. Sophia Morrell, Finra to Issue Investor Alert on Reverse Convertibles, RISK, Mar. 27,
2009,
http://www.risk.net/structured-products/feature/1527328/finra-issue-investor-alert-reverseconvertibles.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Richard Vagnoni).
123. Id. (quoting Richard Vagnoni).
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to interference of the law when specific problems arise, trading in financial promises and risks must be backed by substantive regulation to ensure that the promisors are able to meet their promises. Otherwise, the
financial system, and consequently the economy, may be threatened. 124
When, if at all, should institutional investors be regulated? If
complex, combined, decoupled instruments, such as bonds that carry
shareholder risks, are truly wagers, I assume that investors may speculate
with their own money. However, institutional investors should not be
allowed to use entrusted money and assets to engage in wagering, even
when they receive express permission from the true owners. If the owners wish to gamble, they must do so by exercising their control over their
own money (not that of others).
E. A Radical Regulatory View May Be Worth Examining
Intermediaries that create financial risk for others should retain
some of the risk that they create. Insured institutions and persons that
create excessive risks for their insurers should retain some of the risks.
Insurance companies know how to do that to protect themselves against
the “moral hazards” of the insured. They do that through “deductibles,
co-payments, exclusions, and experience rating.”125 “A deductible is the
exclusion of a certain amount of expense from coverage; coinsurance
requires the individual to pay some fraction of each dollar of cost.”126
Deductibles do not deter people from using insurance.127 However, coinsurance varies inversely with the use of insurance. The higher the percentage of co-insurance and the more the insured must pay the less insurance the co-insurer will use.128 “Exclusions serve to narrow the types of
risks that are covered by a policy, e.g., most (if not all) policies exclude
losses that result from intentional acts of the insured.”129 The same prin-

124. Interview with Nicholas Valerio III, supra note 72.
125. Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 86 (2000–2001).
126. Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535 n.4
(1968).
127. In a study regarding medical insurance, Mark V. Pauly finds that “the deductible either (a)
has no effect on an individual’s usage or (b) induces him to consume that amount of care he would
have purchased if he had no insurance. If there are income effects on individual demands, because
the deductible makes the individual poorer his usage will be restrained somewhat even if he covers
the deductible.” Id. at 536.
128. Id. Pauly also finds that the “optimal extent of coinsurance is the coverage of that percentage of the cost of each unit of medical care at which the utility gain to the individual from having an
additional small fraction of the cost of each unit of care covered by insurance equals the utility loss
to him upon having to pay for the ‘excess’ units of care whose consumption the additional coverage
encourages.” Id.
129. Beal, supra note 125, at 86–87 (footnote omitted). “[A]n experience rating is the insureds’ ‘track record’; greater losses result in higher premiums.” Id. at 87.
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ciples should apply to lenders who sell loans and to managers who manage other people’s money, whether they are investment advisers or directors and officers of a corporation. The same principles should apply to
investment bankers and brokers who offer auction notes. Intermediaries
engaged in the financial system should carry some of the risk that they
create for others, and that risk cannot be transferred. To be sure, both
intermediaries and their clients may seek coverage for the risks they take
that affect others. In such a case, however, the intermediaries will bear
higher costs than others that are more cautious. Let the example of such
coverage be the one that has been adopted by insurance companies for
many years as deductibles.130
I conclude that the latest financial innovations have undermined
ownership protection. These decouplings have not offered owners any
risk protection. The reverse is true: the decouplings have benefitted intermediaries at the risk and expense of the owners. Never before has
ownership been exposed to so much risk from those who control, and
never before, not even during the 1920s, have innovations played such a
deceptive role in giving free and unaccountable control over ownership.
The time has come to focus on the separation of control from accountability to owners. This should be the focus of the future regulation.

130. Pauly, supra note 126, at 535 n.4.

